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I. INTRODUCTION
Food is at the base of human development. The International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1974
recognized the right to food,1 and in particular the right of adequate
* Alexandra Esmel is an International Economic Law postgraduate of the
University of Maastricht and a Civil and Common Law graduate of the Université

507

508

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[31:4

food.2 The same year, the World Food Summit defined “Food
Security” as the “availability at all times of adequate world food
supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food
consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices.”3
This includes: availability of food, access to food, utilization of food
(within a healthy diet), and the stability of the previous three
criteria.4
Since time immemorial, every sovereign state has had the
objective of achieving food security for citizens, notably the
availability of food and the access to food, and this objective now
has achieved in liberalized markets. The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) of 1994 recognized the peculiar nature
of agriculture products within liberalized trade and noted the
negative impact of a sudden liberalization of trade of agricultural
commodities for net-food importing countries.5 On this note, article 6
of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States 1974, also
associated with the Right to Development, passed since into
of Toulouse I. Her professional assignments led her to work on International
Economic Law issues across Europe. She is a French Bar Candidate Class of 2016.
1. JEAN ZIEGLER, PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF ALL HUMAN RIGHTS,
CIVIL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE
RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE RIGHT TO
FOOD ¶ 17 (2008). The Right to Food is defined as:
the right to have regular, permanent and unrestricted access, either directly or by
means of financial purchases, to quantitatively and qualitatively adequate and
sufficient food corresponding to the cultural traditions of the people to which the
consumer belongs, and which ensures a physical and mental, individual and collective,
fulfilling and dignified life free of fear.

Id.

2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11,
Dec. 16, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. (“The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and
his family, including adequate food.”).
3. World Food Conference, Rome, It., Nov. 5-16, 1974, Report of the World
Food Conference, 3, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.65/20, (Nov. 16, 1974).
4. Id. at 38-58; EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FAO FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMME,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF FOOD SECURITY (2008),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/al936e/al936e00.pdf.
5. Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the
Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing
Countries ¶¶ 1-3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal
_e/35-dag_e.htm.
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customary law,6 stated:
[i]t is the duty of States to contribute to the development of international
trade of goods, particularly by means of arrangements and by the
conclusion of long-term multilateral commodity agreements, where
appropriate, and taking into account the interests of producers and
consumers. All States share the responsibility to promote the regular flow
and access of all commercial goods traded at stable, remunerative,
and
equitable prices; thus, contributing to the equitable development of the
world economy, taking into account, in particular, the interests of
developing countries.7

It is worth noting that State’s duty to promote the regular flow and
access of all commercial goods traded at stable, remunerative, and
equitable prices is reflected in the “availability to food” and “access
to food” criteria of food security.
The international food price index rose by 40% in 2007 and by
50% in the beginning of 2008, giving a higher rise percentage
compared to a rise of 9% in 2006.8 This was an unprecedented price
swing. Traditionally, the remunerative and equitable food price
follows the real fundamentals of supply and determines the
agricultural policy of the state. However, the growing importance of
financial speculators have come into play in the price determination
of agricultural commodities. Current literature abounds with studies
and demonstrations of causal links, or lack thereof, between
excessive speculation and the commodities prices. Certain
economists, such as Kilian and Murphy,9 have established a causal
link between these aberrant price increases of agricultural
commodities and speculative activities in the financial markets.

6. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, para. 1(b) (defining
customary law as a primary source of international law and as evidence of a
general practice accepted as law).
7. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 29/3281, art.
6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974).
8. Sudan Institutional Capacity Programme: Food Sec. Info. for Action/Food
& Agric. Org., Determinants of Current Food Price Hikes and their Implications
in the Northern States of Sudan, 3 (Oct. 2008), http://www.fao.org/sudanfood
security/sifsia-publications/sifsia-parchive/en/?page=10&ipp=10.
9. Lutz Kilian & Daniel P. Murphy, The Role of Inventories and Speculative
Trading in the Global Market for Crude Oil, 29 J. APPLIED ECONOMETRICS 454,
454-78 (2014).
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Other economists, such as Krugman10 and Wolf,11 on the contrary,
found evidence that speculator activities were not consistent with the
food price spike of 2007 to 2008.12
The question at hand is whether financial speculators’ virtual
forestalling of prices can increase real agricultural prices. In the
affirmative, if speculation can have an impact on prices and their
volatility, what kind of reform is taken to prevent the establishment
of this new-normal regime?
This article is therefore organized in three main axes. The first axis
will focus on understanding the market environment and the
evolution of agricultural commodities and how finance realized a
coup d’état over such a particular good. The link between excessive
speculation in financial markets and the price of food for consumers
is of essence in this problem. The literature has been conflicted and
is contradicting regarding speculation in agricultural commodities.
The second axis shall focus on what is established: it is possible that
excessive speculation has a serious detrimental effect on agricultural
prices and thereby, on the ability of millions of persons to have
access to food. Basis of the findings here, the third axis will analyze
the legal developments in the European Union and the United States
regarding speculation-induced high prices and how effective their
implementation can be.

10. See Paul Krugman, The Oil Nonbubble, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/12/opinion/12krugman.html?_r=0.
11. See Martin Wolf, The market sets high oil prices to tell us what to do, FIN.
TIMES, May 13, 2008, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/219fcbde-2108-11dd-a0e6000077b07658.html#axzz4HQjqLHME.
12. Jeffrey A. Frankel, Effects of Speculation and Interest Rates in a “Carry
Trade” Model of Commodity Prices 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 19463, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19463.
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II. SPECULATION IN THE AGRICULTURAL
COMMODITIES MARKET
A. FINANCIALIZATION AND DEREGULATION OF THE MARKET
The GATT’s adoption in 1947,13 the World Trade Organization’s
creation in 1995,14 or the wide adhesion to the Washington
Consensus from the 1990s onwards15 gave liberalization to facilitate
international trade, suggesting deregulation. In the financial sector,
liberal policies have often been paired with domestic deregulation of
financial activities.
In the United States, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 established
the incompatibility of the inherent activities of depository banks with
that of investment banks to restrict potential conflict of interests and
risks. The Act provided:
[N]o member bank shall be affiliated . . . with any corporation,
association, business trust, or other similar organization engaged
principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution
at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds,
debentures, notes, or other securities.16

However, from the 1980s onwards, the Federal Reserve
reinterpreted the Glass-Steagall Act to gradually raise the
percentages of gross revenues that could originate from investment
banking activities and in 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (also
known as the Financial Modernization Act) repealed all restrictions
between activities of depository banks and investment banks.17 In
13. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Arts. II, X, XI, Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (indicating progressive
abolition of barriers to trade, e.g. tariffs and other non-quantitative barriers to
trade).
14. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Preamble, Art. III, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh
Agreement].
15. See generally Stanley Fischer, The Washington Consensus, in GLOBAL
ECONOMICS IN EXTRAORDINARY TIMES: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN WILLIAMSON
11, 12-15 (C. Fred Bergsten & C. Randall Henning eds., 2012)
16. Banking Act of 1933, H.R. 5661, 73d Cong. § 20 (1933) [hereinafter
Glass-Steagall Act] (defining the separation of financial institutions, or banks,
from businesses).
17. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101(a), 113 Stat.
1338 (1999) (repealing Glass-Steagall Act); see also Glass-Steagall Act, supra
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2004, the Security Exchange Commission (“SEC”) loosened even
more of the regulatory oversight of global investment banking by
relaxing the net capital rule and introduced a self-monitoring system
for their activities.18
On the other side of the Atlantic, the financial sector has also been
quite self-regulated. In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007 to
2008, the European Commission recognized the inadequate (micro
and macro-prudential) supervision and regulation of the financial
sector, which led to the recurrent birth of asset bubbles and systemic
risks created by the unregulated shadow-banking system.19
Generally, the growing use of new and complex financial
instruments made it difficult for regulatory authorities to keep up. In
particular, the exponential use of new and unregulated derivative
instruments,20 such as credit default swaps, has largely been put to
blame for the financial crisis of 2007 to 2008.21 The picture gets even
note 16, at § 20. The Act provides:
after one year from the date of enactment of the Act no member bank shall be
affiliated with a securities corporation in the manner described in Section 2(b) of the
present Act (where the word “affiliate” is defined so as not to include holding
company affiliates). A violation of this provision subjects the member bank to a
penalty of $1,000 a day, in the discretion of the Federal Reserve Board, and if the
violation is continued for six months after warning from the Board, the bank’s
franchise may be forfeited, if a national bank, or its membership in the Federal
Reserve System may be forfeited, if a State Bank.

Id.
18. MATTHEW SHERMAN, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES, A SHORT HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL DEREGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
11 (2009),
http://cepr.net/publications/reports/a-short-history-of-financial-deregulation-in-theunited-states (stating that the loosening of regulatory oversight would allow
investment banks to hold fewer reserves, take more debt, i.e. take more risks).
19. See European Commission, Economic Review of the Financial Regulation
Agenda, at 5-8, COM (2014) 279 final (May 15, 2014) (concluding that the lack of
regulation and oversight contributed significantly to the financial crisis).
20. Derivatives are financial instruments whose values depend on that of the
underlying asset. See Derivatives, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, https://www.occ.gov/topics/capitalmarkets/financial-markets/derivatives/index-derivatives.html.
21. See Michael Mirochnik, Credit Default Swaps and the Financial Crisis
(2010), Columbia University Academic Commons, http://academiccommons.
columbia.edu/catalog/ac%3A138122; Satyajit Das, Credit default swaps:
Financial innovation or financial dysfunction? (2010), 14 FIN. STABILITY R. 46
(2010); David T. Llewellyn, The Northern Rock crisis: A multi-dimensional
problem waiting to happen, 16 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 35 (2008); Paul
Krugman, Six Doctrines in Search of a Policy Regime, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2010,

2016]

FOOD SPECULATION

513

more nebulous when over-the-counter (“OTC”) trades occur. OTC
trades are not associated with clearing houses.22 There is no third
party confirming the obligation of the buyer or the seller and both the
buyer and seller bear a credit risk, thereby adding more risks to the
use of OTC futures trading. In 1999, then chairwoman of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), Brooksley
Born warned of the important risks of unregulated OTC derivative
markets, quoting their lack of transparency, excessive leverage, and
insufficient prudential controls.23 Interestingly, the old “rule against
difference contracts” in the United Kingdom, where difference
contracts refer to derivatives, stated that a judge could not enforce an
arrangement unless at least one party had an economic interest in the
underlying asset or security,24 thereby giving preference to the
physical owners of commodities. Still, 85-90% of non-commercial
investment in commodities markets currently occur through OTC
trading.25 OTC trading of commodities, contracts, and other financial
instruments occur generally over the phone or electronically26 and
not on a regulated exchange; hence, revealing OTC trading’s
opaqueness, but practical and speedy use. On both sides of the
Atlantic, the financial system where the evolution of commodities
has become more concentrated, complex and opaque.

http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/six-doctrines-in-search-of-a-policyregime/?_r=0.
22. Glossary, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/education/glossary.
html (last visited Mar. 10, 2016) (“The procedure through which [a clearing house]
becomes the buyer to each seller of a futures contract, and the seller to each buyer,
and assumes responsibility for protecting buyers and sellers from financial loss by
ensuring buyer and seller performance on each contract.”).
23. Brooksley Born, Chairperson, Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Regulatory Reponses to Risks in
the OTC Derivatives Market 2 (Nov. 13, 1998), http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches/
opaborn-40.htm.
24. JENNIFER S. TAUB, OTHER PEOPLE’S HOUSES: HOW DECADES OF
BAILOUTS, CAPTIVE REGULATORS, AND TOXIC BANKERS MADE HOME
MORTGAGES A THRILLING BUSINESS 237 (2014).
25. INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POLICY, COMMODITIES MARKET SPECULATION:
THE RISK TO FOOD SECURITY AND AGRICULTURE 6 (2008) [hereinafter IATP].
26. CFTC Glossary, CFTC, http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/
EducationCenter/CFTCGlossary/index.htm#O (last visited Mar. 10, 2016)
[hereinafter CFTC Glossary].
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B. INSTRUMENTS IN AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES MARKET
Agricultural commodities such as wheat, corn, and cotton are
traded in the market in the form of derivative financial instruments
because farmers around the world need to protect themselves from
the risk of bad harvests and/or price fluctuations of the commodity
they produce. To do so, they enter into contractual relations with
intermediaries, fixing in advance the price of their products the
quantity, the quality, and the date of delivery27
As such, a future contract is an agreement to purchase or sell a
commodity for delivery in the future at a price that is determined at
initiation of the contract, which obligates each party of the contract
to fulfill the contract at the specified price. This is used to assume or
shift price risk and may be satisfied by delivery or offset.28 Traders
can also enter options contracts, contracts that give the buyer the
right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a specified quantity of a
commodity or other instrument at a specific price within a specified
period of time, regardless of the market price of that instrument.
Finally, traders can enter swap agreements. A swap is a technique
where the parties involved exchange the payments derived from the
prices of an underlying commodity without transferring the
ownership of the commodities.29 They play a peculiar role in the
agricultural commodities market as seen further below.
The commodity futures market in the United States is covered by
the Commodity Exchange Act 1936 (“CEA”).30 The CEA was
amended in 1974 to establish the CFTC, a specialized and
independent agency with the authority to regulate the futures and
options markets in the United States. The proclaimed mission of the
CFTC is to “protect the public interests by providing means for
managing and assuming price risks, discovering prices, and/or
disseminating pricing information through trading in liquid, fair and
financially secure trading facilities for commodities” (emphasis

27. European Commission, Agricultural Markets Task Force: Issue Paper
(2016), http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/agri-markets-task-force/2016-06-28/paperself-help-tools.pdf.
28. IATP, supra note 25, at 4.
29. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47) (2012).
30. Id. §§ 2(a)(1)(A)-(B).
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added).31 While the Commodities Exchange Act 1936 created the
CFTC as the federal regulator for the futures and options market, the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”) was
passed to streamline and eliminate unnecessary regulation from the
CEA Act32 that were deemed too cumbersome for the
competitiveness of the U.S. commodity market. One of its landmark
provisions was to exclude from the application of the CEA, and
therefore from the mandate of the CFTC, OTC derivatives
transactions such as futures contracts between institutional
participants.33
Astronomic numbers of futures and options trades are conducted
in financial centers such as London, New York, Paris or Frankfurt to
serve the economy and answer the demand worldwide.34 The further
deregulation of the commodities futures markets has attracted more
and more investors and increased the flow of money and of
speculative activities in the market.

C. SPECULATION AND SPECULATORS: THE GOOD AND THE BAD
Speculating refers to the act of buying or selling an asset with the
intention to resell or re-buy at a later date when the action is
motivated by the hope of a modification of the current price and not
by the advantage inherent to the usage of the asset, its processing, or
the transfer of a market to another.35 The belief of the crystallization
of a future economic event may vary from one investor to the other,
which is why speculation has to do with the “psychology” of the
speculator or of the market.36

31. Id. § 5a.
32. Commodity Futures Modernization Act, H.R. 5660, 106th Cong. § 2
(2000).
33. See Title VI, 7 U.S.C. § 1a.
34. These financial centers include the London International Futures
Exchanges in London, the Chicago Board of Trade and the ICE US Futures in the
United States, the “Marches a Termes Financiers” in Paris, and the the Deutsche
Börse in Frankfurt or CME Globex: electronic trading system.
35. COURET ET AL., DROIT FINANCIER [FINANCIAL LAW] 672 (2012).
36. See E. Glen Weyl & Eric Posner, A Proposal for Limiting Speculation on
Derivatives: An FDA for Financial Innovation 3 (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law
& Economics, Working Paper No. 594, 2012), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
Lawecon/index.html (explaining the numerous person and market-specific factors
that create speculation).
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According to the CFTC, a speculator in commodity futures is “a
trader who does not hedge, but who trades with the objective of
achieving profits through the successful anticipation of price
movements”37 and thereby reinforcing the idea that speculation is
characterized by the mere search of economic profit, without adding
any real value to the asset. By speculating on the occurrence of X or
Y event, the speculator only creates risk where there was none
before.38 In opposition, a traditional investment, in which the
investor, while hoping to generate income in time, adds real value to
the invested asset. However, one must keep in mind that speculating
usually involves taking a high risk in exchange for equivalently high
returns; hence, why speculating compares with gambling activities.
As we have seen earlier, agricultural commodities are traded under
the form of futures contracts. There are therefore two prices to take
into account in the agricultural commodities derivative markets: the
value of the actual commodity, also known as the spot price, and the
future price. The spot price stems from the physical or spot market.
This spot market is where the cash transactions for the physical or
actually commodity occur; hence the fact that the spot price refers to
the current price of the commodity at any time for immediate
delivery. On the contrary, the futures contract price is a construction
of the speculator, an anticipation of the spot price at maturation of
the contract when the delivery comes.39 As such, speculators hold
positions in the commodities derivatives market to take advantage of
the evolution of the price in the spot markets. As the European
Commission explains:
If a speculator expects the spot price on the expiry date of the futures
contract to be higher than the price of the contract, he will buy the
contract. If the spot price on the expiry date of the contract is lower than
the contract price he loses. Similarly, if a speculator expects spot prices
on the expiry date of a contract to be lower than the price of the contract

37. CFTC Glossary, supra note 26.
38. See IATP, supra note 25, at 4 (noting that excessive speculation leads to
increased price volatility and greater risk in the market).
39. European Commission, Task Force on the Role of Speculation in
Agricultural Commodities Price Movements; Is there a Speculative Bubble in
Commodity Markets?, at 5, SEC (2008) 2971 final (Nov. 21, 2008) [hereinafter
Task Force].
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he will sell the contract short. If the spot price at the expiry date of the
contract is lower than the contract price, the investor earns a profit by
buying the contract cheaper before expiry and delivering it to the
counterparty.40

1. Commercial Traders and Hedging
Commercial traders, also known as “hedgers,” are the original
financial intermediaries between the holder of the physical
commodity and the commodity markets. Generally, they are the
specialists of the markets and make informed decisions to keep their
profits and losses within a certain margin. Moreover, their purchases
of futures contracts provide the necessary liquidity to the functioning
of the market,41 the price of which provide an indication of the value
of the commodity based on the fundamentals of the real economy,
the transportation costs of the product, and the availability of
supplies.42 The British “rule against difference contracts,” referred to
above,43 was primarily meant to favor these traders with physical
ownership of the underlying commodity with hedging purposes.44
The transparency of the determination of the price makes it reliable
information for all the parties involved. Consequently, they support
the good functioning of the market and serve the purpose of the
agricultural commodities market: helping farmers managing risks;
hedging against it, and participating in the due price discovery
process of the commodities. According to De Schutter, this type of
speculation “reduces price volatility, because speculators provide a
market for hedgers, and because they buy when the price is low and
sell when the price is high, thus evening out extremes of prices.”45
40. Id. at 6.
41. Rens van Tilburg & Myriam Bander Stichele, Feeding the Financial Hype:
How Excessive Financial Investments Impact Agricultural Derivatives Markets, 9,
21-22 (SOMO, Amsterdam, Neth., Nov. 2011).
42. PETER WAHL, WORLD ECON. ECOLOGY & DEV., FOOD SPECULATION: THE
MAIN FACTOR OF THE PRICE BUBBLE IN 2008 11 (2009).
43. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
44. See Lynn. A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit
Crisis, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 11 (2011) (stating that derivative contracts
between speculating parties who did have ownership were void and legally
unenforceable).
45. Olivier de Schutter (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Food
Commodities Speculation and Food Price Crises: Regulation to Reduce the Risks
of Price Volatility, 4 (Sept. 2010), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/
docs/Briefing_Note_02_September_2010_EN.pdf [hereinafter Food Commodities
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2. Noncommercial Traders and Financial Speculation
Non-commercial traders play also a large role in the agricultural
commodity market in the sense that they do not deal with the same
physical risks that commercial traders face. As a balance, they
usually take the opposite position of commercial traders,46 taking
higher risks for greater returns. Non-commercial traders are usually
opposed to commercial traders in that their interest lies solely in
maximizing profits. The fact that they are supposed to take higher
risks explained their initial relative minority in the market compared
to commercial traders.
De Schutter estimates the surge of arrival of these non-commercial
investors, such as pension funds, hedge funds, sovereign wealth
funds, and large banks, came into the agricultural commodity
markets as early as 2001.47 In 2007, the mortgage crisis in the United
States also triggered the arrival of this new type of investors to cover
the shortcomings of the real estate market. Pursuant to the repeal of
the Glass-Steagall Act and the application of the CFMA, which
excluded OTC markets from the regulatory mandate of the SEC and
of the CFTC, there was a shift in the commercial/non-commercial
composition of the agricultural commodity market.48 The figures
went up to 60% for financial speculators in the market.49 The
Research Center SOMO acknowledges that financial speculators
compose 70% of the market with 30% comprising of commercial
hedgers.50 The CFTC observed an increase from 12% speculators and
78% hedging/traditional investors in 1996 to 69% speculators and
31% hedging/traditional investors in 2011.51
Speculation].
46. See CFTC, STAFF REPORT ON COMMODITY SWAP DEALERS & INDEX
TRADERS WITH COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS 68 (2008) (stating that noncommercial traders have different objectives that oppose those of commercial
traders).
47. Food Commodities Speculation, supra note 45, at 6.
48. BENOIT GUILLEMINOT, JEAN-JACQUE OHANA & STEVE OHANA, LES
NOUVEAUX MODES D’INVESTISSEMENT SUR LES MARCHES DERIVES DE MATIERES
PREMIERES AGRICOLES [NEW METHODS FOR INVESTING IN AGRICULTURAL RAW
MATERIALS DERIVATIVES MARKETS] 79-80 (2012).
49. Stephen Spratt, Food Price Volatility and Financial Speculation 5 (Future
Agric. Consortium, Working Paper No. 047, 2013).
50. See van Tilburg & Bander Stichele, supra note 41, at 22.
51. Id.; Letter from Dennis M. Kelleher et al., President & CEO, Better
Markets, Inc., on Position Limits for Derivatives to David A. Stawick, Secretary,
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This structural change affected the dominant strategy of the
agricultural commodities market by not “betting” on commodities for
insurance and hedging, but strategizing solely for profits from price
arbitrage. To that end, swap agreements have been very instrumental.
Swaps are widely used by non-commercial market participants,
notably commodity index funds. A commodity swap agreement
usually refers to a “bilateral contract between counterparties who
agree to exchange a series of cash flows at periodic dates.”52 The
exchange of cash flows in a swap agreement can derive from the
price changes in a wide variety of commodities. Index traders mostly
trade on OTC markets via swap dealers reflecting their position on
the market. The swap dealer, acting as a bridge between the
commodity index fund and the futures market, will then hedge the
financial risk of the underlying commodity price fluctuation in the
spot market by buying futures contracts on a listed exchange;53
hence, the tradition to identify swap dealers as commercial traders, or
a unique category, because they take positions in the market to hedge
risks. A swap agreement is advantageous because it offers the
involved counterparties the possibility to customize the agreement
terms to their hedging needs54 because they are not as strictly
regulated as futures.55 As such, swaps are a crucial OTC instrument
to access the agricultural commodity market and its futures contracts,
notably for commodity index funds seeking to diversify their
portfolio.
These index funds are characterized by the simultaneous trade
over a variety of soft and hard commodities in an index.56 They base
their “investment” on a mathematical formula that follows the price
movement of up to twenty-four hard and soft commodities to capture

CFTC (Mar. 28, 2011), http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.
aspx?id=34010&SearchText=better%20markets (concluding that speculation in
commodity markets has increased significantly).
52. GERALD D. GAY & ANAND VENKATESWARAN, THE PRICING AND
VALUATION OF SWAPS IN FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: PRICING AND RISK
MANAGEMENT 405, 405 (Robert W. Kolb & James A. Overdahl eds., 2010).
53. Letter from Dennis M. Kelleher et al. to David A Stawick, supra note 51,
at 17.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. See Food Commodities Speculation, supra note 45.

520

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[31:4

the slightest benefit from a price arbitrage.57 According to U.S.
Congressman Bart Stupak in 2008, “[s]ince 2003, commodity index
speculation has increased 1,900 percent, from an estimated $13
billion to $260 billion. Lehman Brothers recently estimated that the
crude oil price goes up about 1.5 percent for every $100 million in
commodity index investments.”58
The size of commodities indices such as the S&P Goldman Sachs
Commodity Indices (“GSCI”),59 Dow Jones Commodity Indices, and
the Rogers International Commodities have led them to become a
commodities price referencing tool in the industry, even though they
are inherently tools of speculation on commodities prices.
Index traders generally put pressure on price to go up while having
no physical ownership of the underlying commodities. GSCI, for
example, had a strategy of holding only long positions for buying
pressure.60 All in all, it is a question of scale in purchasing important
amounts of future contracts. Index traders may affect prices through
their actions.61 For example, prices go up when index traders buy
large amounts of money in the food commodities market and thereby
pour large amounts of money in the commodities market.62 Prices go
down when index traders sell large amounts of money in the food
commodities market and thereby pull large amounts of money in the
commodities market.63
57. IATP, supra note 25.
58. See Commodity Exchange Act: Hearing on H.R. 6330 Before the House
Agric. Comm., 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Rep. Bart Stupak).
59. See U.N. Dep’t of Econ. and Soc. Affairs, The Global Social Crisis, 1, 29,
U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/334 (2011).
60. See Food Commodities Speculation, supra note 45, at 4 (noting that while
the index was advertised as a tool for price reference, its underlying principle and
function was momentum speculation to “hedge against adverse movements in the
financial markets . . . .”); U.N. Trade and Dev. Rep., The Financialization of
Commodity Markets, 1, 56, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TDR/2009 (2009); Michael W.
Masters, Managing Member/Portfolio Manager, Masters Capital Management,
LLC, Testimony Before the Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n (Aug. 5,
2009).
61. See Anis Chowdhury, Food Price Hikes: How Much is Due to Excessive
Speculation, ECON. & POL. WKLY., 13, 13 (July 2011).
62. Michael W. Masters & Adam K. White, How Institutional Investors are
Driving Up Food and Energy Prices, ACCIDENTAL HUNT BROTHERS, 1, 13 (July
2008).
63. Id. at ii (asserting that when Index Speculators spend large amounts of
money into a small number of commodities, future prices rise significantly while
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The traditional schism between commercial and non-commercial
speculators, and hedgers and index speculators in the agricultural
commodities market can seem obsolete considering that at times both
could per se meet definition of speculators; hence, the reference to
good speculators and bad speculators. However, they have different
consequences on the market and often stem from different rationales:
either the fundamentals of the real economy, the parameters of
supply and demand, or profits. Many believe that the large number of
index speculators trading agricultural commodities just like any other
asset and in disconnection with the rules of supply and demand
eventually result in abhorrent commodities prices.64 The CFTC itself
observed that “instead of pricing just supply and demand factors,
commodity markets have begun to price commodities’ value as an
asset class as well, creating a price distortion or possibly even a
bubble.”65 All the same, Michael W. Masters and Adam K White
stated:
Index Speculators have bought more commodities futures contracts in the
last five years than any other group of market participant. They are now
the single most dominant force in the commodities futures markets. And
most importantly, their buying and trading has nothing to do with the
supply and demand fundamentals of any single commodity. They pour
money into commodities futures to diversify their portfolios, hedge
against inflation or bet against the dollar (emphasis added).66

The 2008 food price crisis has fostered a tumultuous debate on the
potential effects of financial speculation in agricultural commodities
markets. At its crux, the issues revolve around the existence or lack
thereof of an actual causal link between excessive speculation and
price volatility and/or increase. This causal link could also be
indirect as some suggested that speculation might just have triggered
or amplified the price volatility of 2008. With that being established,
can speculators be held responsible for unreasonably increasing
commodity markets “expand . . . to absorb this influx of money.”).
64. Id. (providing quotations from recent research reports on how institutional
investors have caused commodities prices, such as food, to increase by investing in
commodities futures).
65. See Michael V. Dunn, Commissioner, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, Testimony Before the Swiss Futures and Options Ass’n (Sept. 5,
2008).
66. See Masters & White, supra note 62.
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commodities prices?

III. A LEGAL FINDING OF FAULT?
The weight of financial speculation, as opposed to traditional
speculation for hedging purposes, has increased due to the financial
liberalization of commodity markets and created a temptation of
excess. According to the CEA Section 4a, speculation in the
commodities futures market is prohibited when the following
cumulative conditions are met: it is excessive; it is causing sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or changes in the price of such commodity;
and is an undue and unnecessary burden on interstate commerce in
such commodity.67
The above conditions lead to the following legal reasoning of
determining an act, a damage, and a link of causality between the act
and the damage.

A. THE ACT: EXCESSIVE SPECULATION
Excessive speculation has been defined as the “amount of
speculation beyond that which is necessary or normal relative
to hedging needs,”68 insofar as speculation in the agricultural
commodity market provides liquidity for hedgers to trade in the
market. Logically, determining excessive speculation requires data
on speculating activities from which we could excerpt a quantitative
notion.
The Working T’s Index uses an algebraic formula to analyze the
balance between speculative activity and the net demand for hedging
in the agricultural commodity market, based on the assumption that
non-commercial traders also provide liquidity for hedgers.69 The
excessive character of speculation in Working T’s index is then
ascertained by comparison to historical norms which at the time were
considered excessive or not.70 Nevertheless, the index is only truly
67. 7. U.S.C. § 4(a) (2000).
68. See Commodity Future Markets, OECD FOOD, AGRIC, & FISHERIES, 1, 1
(2010).
69. See Valentina G. Bruna et al., The Financialization of Food?, BANK OF
CANADA, 1, 8 (2013).
70. See Dwight R. Sanders et al., The Adequacy of Speculation in Agricultural
Futures Markets: Too Much of a Good Thing?, in MKTG. & OUTLOOK RESEARCH
REPORT 1, 15 (Dep’t of Agric. & Consumer Econ., Univ. Ill. Urbana-Champaign
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informative if there is a clear identification of the market participants
as commercial and institutional speculators or non-commercial
traders and hedgers, as well as the details in quantity of their trading
activities.71 The Working T’s Index is the quantitative indicator of
excessive speculation but just like any equation, its results will be
contingent to the data. For instance, a recent study of Hilary Till on
excessive speculation in the U.S. oil futures market concluded that
there is no evidence of excessive speculation in the U.S. oil market
based on traditional speculative metrics; but only if the definition of
excessive speculation applies. It is acceptable to use the historical
agricultural futures markets as a guide to the adequacy (or excess) of
speculation,72 excluding futures-spreading activity over the past three
years that could have constituted excessive speculation.
According to Working’s equation, there is excessive speculation
when the result is superior to 1. E.g., a result of 1.19 would indicate
speculation in excess of 19%. However, that alone is not sufficient to
conclude the existence of price damaging speculation: a comparison
must be made with historical norms of speculation. The charts below
resulting from a study of Algieri (2012) of ZEF highlight the
difficulty in defining excessive speculation. Depending on the
markets concerned, the economic context of the period at hand and
that is, the exogenous circumstances have to be similar enough to
construe a comparison.

eds., 2008), 1, 15 (2008) (disagreeing with the postulation that speculation led to
“bubbles in the agricultural futures prices. . . [because] it is not outside of historical
norms . . . recent price increases do not neatly fit a bubble explanation . . . high
prices have been observed for commodities without futures markets . . . .” it will
incentives storage for commodities).
71. Id. at 7-8.
72. See Hillary Till, Has There Been Excessive Speculation in the U.S. Oil
Futures Market?, PRIMA RES., EDHEC-RISK INST., 1, 6 (2009).
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73

The U.S. CFTC often condemns traders not for speculating
excessively, but for being in violation of the position limits set by the
regulatory agency.74 In accordance with Section 5(d) of the CEA,
which gave regulatory mandate to the CFTC, designated contract
markets (“DCM”) are required to adopt speculative position limits or
position accountability for speculators, where necessary and
appropriate, to reduce the potential threat of market manipulation or
congestion, especially during trading in the delivery month.75 The
73. See Bernardiana Algieri, Price Volatility, Speculation, and Excessive
Speculation in Commodity, UNIV. BONN CENTER FOR DEV. RES. 1, 21 (2012)
(Charts extracted from ZEF Discussion Papers on Development Policy No. 166 of
Bernardina Algieri).
74. See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, Enforcement Actions,
http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/Enforcement/EnforcementActions/index.htm
(stating that the CFTC will take enforcement actions against individuals and firms
registered with the Commission, who are engaged in commodity futures and option
trading on designated domestic exchanges, and those who improperly market
futures and options contracts).
75. See
Glossary
Explanation
of
Speculative
Limits,
CFTC,
http://www.cftc.gov/industryoversight/marketsurveillance/speculativelimits/index.
htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2016) (citing to the CFTC’s Speculative Limits
Guidelines which aims to protect future markets from excess speculation through
regulating “the size (or levels of the limits themselves; the exemptions from the
limits (for example, hedged positions)); and the policy on aggregating accounts for
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traders found with speculative position in excess of those set by the
CFTC are then sentenced to fines.76
All in all, an analysis of the Working T Index leads question what
a finding of excessive speculation actually looks like. Clearly it must
be above the value of 1 and also far above historical norms pushing
even further the notion of excess.

B. THE DAMAGE
Food price hikes and volatility are undermining the right to food, a
socio-economic notion derived from the U.N. International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights right to an adequate
standard of living including adequate food. According to the FAO,
the right to food corresponds to the right to feed oneself, which
requires not only that food is available, but also that it is accessible –
i.e. that each household either has the means to produce or buy its
own food.77 However, accessibility is threatened by prices defying
the rules of supply and demand. The price volatility of agricultural
commodities can have a significant impact on the lives of people
with little purchasing power or create an uncertainty that impedes
economic growth.
A price increase of basic foodstuffs can push certain populations
towards extreme poverty while others might not see their purchasing
power affected substantially. A study of nine low income countries
has demonstrated that short-term price increases in foodstuff can
increase the level of poverty on the national level by 4.5%.78

the purposes of applying the limits.”).
76. See CFTC, ORDERS CHINA-BASED WEIDONG GE AND SHEENSON
INVESTMENTS, LTD. TO PAY MONETARY SANCTIONS FOR VIOLATING SPECULATIVE
POSITION LIMITS IN COTTON AND SOYBEAN FUTURES (Sept. 25, 2012).
77. See U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Mission to Canada
(May 2012) (by Olivier de Schutter) (asserting that the right to food is
comprehensively indoctrinated in the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights under article 11.1 and provides that the meaning of
“adequacy” extends to “prevailing social, economic, cultural, climatic, ecological
and other conditions, while ‘sustainability’ incorporates the notion of long-term
availability and accessibility).
78. Maros Ivanic & Will Martin, Implications of Higher Global Food Prices
for Poverty in Low-Income Countries, WORLD BANK DEV. RES. GROUP, 1, 20
(Apr. 2008).
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Moreover, the risk of price volatility is born not only by the
consumers but also the producers and in the long-run the
governments which are naturally held responsible by its people to
have “sovereignty” over food and to provide food security.
According to Lagi et al. 2011, when food becomes inaccessible to
the population, “the underlying reason for support of the system is
eliminated”;79 hence, actions taken to oppose the failing government.
Food insecurity aggravates any other failures of the government,
which alone may take a long time to surface. In 2007-2008, the
correlation between high food prices and food riots in several
countries was evident: Mexico, Mexico in 2007; India, New Delhi in
2008; Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou, in 2008; to quote only a few. In
Ouagadougou, the Secretary General of the Confédération Nationale
des Travailleurs du Burkina (National Confederation of Workers)
even referred to increasing prices as “having matches near cotton that
can catch fire at any moment.”80 The mere suggestion of a causal link
between excessive speculation and potentially to the risk of social
unrest, can leave some to question the interdependence movement
that the world has known.

C. CAUSAL LINK
The cause-effect relationship between futures contracts prices (or
changes in open interest) and spot prices is not always clear and
causality tests have not been able to provide a straight answer either.
The Granger causality test is a statistical instrument widely used by
econometrists to identify the temporal precedence between two set of
events in a time series.81 For instance, if it is observed that 100% of
79. See Marco Lagi et al., The Food Crises and Political Instability in North
Africa and the Middle East, NEW ENGLAND COMPLEX SYS. INST., 1, 3 (Sept.
2011).
80. Food Riots Shut Down Main Towns, IRIN, (Feb. 22, 2008),
http://www.irinnews.org/report/76905/burkina-faso-food-riots-shut-down-maintowns.
81. See Commodity Future Markets, supra note 68, at 1. The test is defined as:
Granger causality is a standard statistical technique for determining whether one time
series is useful in forecasting another. It is important to bear in mind that the term
causality is used in a statistical sense, and not in a philosophical one of
structural
causation. More precisely a variable A is said to Granger cause B if knowing the time
paths of B and A together improve the forecast of B based on its own time path, thus
providing a measure of incremental predictability.

Id.
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the time an increased participation of index funds in the commodities
derivative market was followed by an increased commodities price,
then one could conclude that that increased participation of index
funds “Granger caused” an increase in commodities prices.
Obviously, one might argue that it does not prove causality, but a
probability in the sense that it is difficult (even impossible) to
“sanitize” this analysis from all other exogenous factors that could
play a role in the occurrence of a specific event.
It is true that there are other influential factors that can act alone or
simultaneously to influence the price of agricultural commodities.
Professor Chowdhury82 listed long term factors in the food price
crisis of 2008: increasing demand, growing population, agricultural
productivity (liberalization of trade; priority on exports, etc.),
production of agrofuels,83 and reduction of food stocks (notably in
the EU). Chowdhury listed the short-term factors: increase in oil
prices (and fertilizer prices notably in 2007/2008), bad harvests, U.S.
dollar exchange rate fluctuations (the U.S. agricultural futures
markets is highly influential and futures and cash contracts are
denominated in dollars), export restrictions on agricultural products
(fail of Doha negotiations on agriculture), and financial speculation.84
These short and long-term factors can only form a “faisceau
d’indices” allowing us to understand the construction of commodity
prices. For instance, Brazil Finance Minister Guido Mandega stated
that high food prices were due to strong demand but also bad
weather, subsidies in developed economies, and financial
speculation.85 The U.N. Special Rapporteur, Olivier de Schutter, also
notes that “while the food price crisis may have been sparked off . . .
by developments affecting demand and supply, its effects were
exacerbated by excessive and insufficiently regulated speculation in
commodity derivatives.”86

82. See Chowdhury, supra note 46, at 12.
83. See Donald Mitchell, A Note on Rising Food Prices, WORLD BANK DEV.
PROSPECTS GROUP, 1 (July 2008) (stating that the increased biofuel production
raised the demand for food commodities).
84. See Chowdhury, supra note 46, at 12.
85. See Joe Leahy, Brazil Opposes Commodity Price Controls, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 15, 2011.
86. See Food Commodities Speculation, supra note 45.
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The precise quantitative impact of excessive financial speculation
of commodities prices is still very much debated, all the more since
the bulk of futures commodities trading occur over-the-counter.
However, it is admitted that excessive speculation has a negative
impact on markets. On this note, Section 4a of the CEA reads:
Excessive speculation in any commodity under contracts of sale of such
commodity for future delivery made on or subject to the rules of contract
markets or derivatives transaction execution facilities causing sudden or
unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of such
commodity, is an undue and unnecessary burden on interstate commerce
in such commodity.87

Interestingly, Professors Irwin and Sanders add to the definition
that a large part of technically excess speculation is economically
necessary for a well-functioning market.88 They also suggested in an
OECD report that speculation did not cause price volatility in food
and energy markets,89 while others put the blame directly on the
financialization of commodities. The joint study of the FAO, IMF,
World Bank, OECD and others affirm that “increased participation
by non-commercial actors such as index funds, swap dealers and
money managers in financial markets probably acted to amplify short
term price swings and could have contributed to the formation of
price bubbles in some situations.”90
There is at least a connection between the value of futures
contracts held by speculators and the establishment of the price of
the underlying commodity. Futures contract prices are intertwined
with the evolution of the spot or cash prices and vice-versa,91 and in
87. 7 U.S.C. § 6a (1936).
88. See Irwin, supra note 52, at 5 (stating the weight of evidence clearly
suggests that increased index fund activity in 2006-08 did not cause a bubble in
commodity future prices).
89. Id.
90. See U.N. FAO ET AL., PRICE VOLATILITY IN FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL
MARKETS: POLICY RESPONSES 12 (2011).
91. See T.V. SOMANATHAN & V. ANANTHA NAGESWARAN, THE ECONOMICS
OF DERIVATIVES 46-47 (2015); Communication From the Commission of the
European Communities to the Council, the European Parliament, the European
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions Food Prices in
Europe, at 5-6, SEC (2008) 2971 final (Nov. 21, 2008) (stating that while there is
no complete clarity or consensus on the degree of causality and the manner in
which the influence works, it is almost universally accepted that forward/futures

2016]

FOOD SPECULATION

529

theory, futures contracts prices converge with that of the spot market
by the date of delivery.92 The arrival of index speculators postCFMA 2000 has drastically changed the market by pouring large
amounts of liquidity in the market and facilitated the invasion index
traders, traditionally holding long positions on futures contracts to
benefit from price increases in the long term.93
In 2008, the inconsistency between supply and demand data and
the price of commodities signaled the shift in the price discovery
process of agricultural commodities. In theory, futures prices and
spot prices should converge by the date of delivery. However, from
January 2007 to June 2008, futures prices were much higher than
spot prices (also known as contango), where they were able to
influence spot market prices during that period in a manner totally
detached from supply and demand data.94 “Excessive” speculation
leads to important price misalignment; hence, the imposition of
position limits by the CFTC to “reduce the potential threat of market
manipulation or congestion.”95 Protracted positions in one direction
can intrinsically affect spot prices which themselves lead to
increased costs for the use futures contracts even for hedging
purposes.
According to certain academics, “rapid drops in prices are more
attributable to bubbles and crash dynamics because the rapid
upwards and downwards movements are difficult to reconcile with
normal fundamentals supply and demand factor.”96 The burst of a
speculative bubble and price swings would therefore translate the
market participants’ reaction to the “real” supply but virtual demand
created in the futures market. For others, including the European
Commission, the correction of prices could also be a sudden
reassessment of market fundamentals by investors based on a good
prices are closely linked to spot prices and that changes in one can, ad in fact
generally do, affect the other).
92. Steve Suppan, Commodity Market Deregulation and Food Prices, INST.
FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y.
93. DEREK HEADEY & SHENGGEN FAN, REFLECTIONS ON THE GLOBAL FOOD
CRISIS 40-43 (Int’l Food Policy & Res. Inst., 2010); Daryll E. Ray & Harwood D.
Schaffer, Index Funds and the 2006-2008 Run-Up in Agricultural Commodity
Prices, U. TENN. AGRIC. POL’Y ANALYSIS CTR. (2011).
94. See SOMANATHAN & NAGESWARAN, supra note 91, at 53.
95. See CFTC, supra note 58.
96. See Lagi, supra note 62.
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harvest or declining consumption of the commodity.97 There is little
evidence to suggest that trading in futures markets has driven the
price run-up or has destabilized the commodity markets during the
first half of 2008.98
This striking absence of consensus and uncertainty of leading
economists is mostly due to the opaqueness of financial flows into
commodity derivatives. Nevertheless, the potential adverse effects of
excessive speculation on the commodities prices could be disastrous
enough to undermine the food security of millions. A correlation
exists, but the debate still rages on even with talks about the
contribution of excessive speculation in food price spikes.99
Moreover, one can question the social usefulness of that amount of
financial speculators; especially those principally driven by price
arbitrage without ownership of the physical underlying commodity,
but with the largest positions in the market. If the question is to know
whether or not excessive speculation triggers or amplifies price
hikes, the burden of proof should lay on its authors for the sake of
protecting the consumers and to promote the integrity of the market.

IV. POLICY AND LEGAL RESPONSES
When high prices make it impossible for millions of people to
access food, it threatens the sovereign duty to ensure food security.
Financial deregulation, particularly that of derivatives, has increased
the role of institutional investors in agricultural commodities. As
mentioned earlier, there is a multitude of elements that enter into
consideration in determining price commodities, but speculation is
one of the few elements that private or public persons perform under
the rule of law.

97. See Suppan, supra note 72.
98. See IMF, IS INFLATION BACK? COMMODITY PRICES AND INFLATION,
WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 92, (Oct. 2008) (explaining that other than gold,
there seems to be no systematic connection between financialization and price
volatility or changes).
99. OECD, RISING FOOD PRICES: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (2008),
http://www.oecd.org/trade/agricultural-trade/40847088.pdf (explaining that there
has been an increase in investing in agricultural derivatives by non-traditional
sources, likely contributing to the rise in short term futures prices and is a factor in
the spike in spot market prices).

2016]

FOOD SPECULATION

531

In 2009, the G8 Summit of L’Aquila tackled the issue of
agricultural price volatility. The G8 Joint Statement on the Global
Food Security Initiative notably insisted upon the rejection of factors
potentially affecting commodity price volatility, including
speculation,100 and coined the term “damaging speculation” probably
to circumvent the issue of defining excessive speculation.101
In April 2011, the G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Governors was particularly fruitful as well. The Meeting
stressed “the need for participants in commodity derivatives markets
to be subjected to appropriate regulation and supervision”102 Two
months later, the G20 Summit in Paris, 2011 further pinpointed the
need of financial regulation. Proposals included the establishment of
a central clearinghouse to register global agricultural transactions,
the standardization of derivatives trading rules in over-the-counter
markets, and the control of agricultural prices.103 France also
proposed a global mechanism to control prices of agricultural
commodities much to the dislike of major agricultural producer such
as Brazil.104
Finally, the G20 Summit of Cannes in November, 2011 welcomed
the IOSCO Principles for the Regulation and Supervision of
100. L’Aquila, Joint Statement, L’Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI) (July
10, 2009), http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/LAquila_Joint_Statement
_on_Global_Food_Security%5B1%5D,0.pdf
[hereinafter
L’Aquila,
Joint
Statement] (stating that the group is committed to reduce trade distortions and
refrain from raising new barriers to trade and investment and to aim for an
ambitious, comprehensive, and balanced approach to end the Doha Round).
101. L’Aquila, Chair’s Summary, G8 Summit 2009, July 10, 2009,
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication15572_en.pdf
(stating to address excessive price volatility in energy and agricultural products,
effective regulation and supervision of derivative markets would enhance
transparency and also combat “damaging speculation”); see L’Aquila, Joint
Statement, supra note 100 (stating that factors potential affecting commodity price
volatility and speculation must be monitored and analysed further).
102. Press Release, G20 France, Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central
Bank Governors (Apr. 2011), https://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/
convention/g20/20110415.pdf (calling for enhance transparency and asking
IOSCO to finalize their suggestions for regulations and supervision of commodity
derivatives markets).
103. G20 RES. GROUP, G20 Plans and Preparations, (Sept. 15, 2011) (stating
that Brazil would oppose any G20 effort to introduce controls or regulations over
international commodities prices and they will fall naturally).
104. See id.
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Commodity Derivatives Markets and called upon market regulators
to use formal position management powers, including the power to
set ex-ante position limits, particularly in the delivery month where
appropriate, among other powers of intervention.105
The policy works aimed at improving the transparency of the
agricultural market and preventing market abuse. On the latter, the
legal follow-up on both side of the Atlantic was significant with the
adoption of ex-ante position limits. Clearly, the inconclusive debate
on excessive speculation has not paralyzed legislators. The law has
taken a step ahead and it is quite interesting to see how financial
regulation handles uncertain risks.

A. POSITION LIMITS: THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH
Position limits are, by essence, preventive measures that ensure
the integrity of the commodity derivatives market. They impose the
maximum, either net long or net short, in one commodity future (or
option) or in all futures (or options) of one commodity combined that
may be held or controlled by one person.106 The latest legal reforms
impose stricter position limits in the United States and present a
brand-new regime of position limits in the European Union.
1. Position Limits in the European Union
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the European Union
undertook a wide-ranging financial reform.107 In 2010, the European
Parliament marked the will of the Union to tackle excessive
speculation and called upon the European Commission to develop
measures to ensure that regulators were able to set position limits to
counter disproportionate price movements and speculative
bubbles.108 The Directive 2014/65/EU (“MiFID II”), which repeals
105. Cannes Summit Final Declaration: Building Our Common Future:
Renewed Collective Action for the Benefit of All, G20 France, Sixth Meeting
(Nov. 4, 2011) (calling on the report to be finished by the end of 2012).
106. See CFTC Glossary: A Guide to the Language of the Futures, CFTC,
http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/CFTCGlossary/index.h
tm (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
107. See generally ERKKI LIIKANAN, CHAIRMAN, HIGH-LEVEL EXPERT GROUP
ON REFORMING THE STRUCTURE OF THE EU BANKING SECTOR 1 (2012).
108. European Parliament Resolution of 15 June 2010 on Derivatives Markets:
Future Policy Actions, P7_TA (2010) 0206 [hereinafter European Parliament
Resolution] (asking the Commission to consider other things such as that the
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the previous MiFID I Directive 2004/39/EC, and Regulation No 600/
2014 (“MiFIR”) on Markets in Financial Instruments will shake up
the commodities markets and the market participants even more so.
MiFID and MiFiR are both set to take effect in 2017, as they
complete each other and should be applied in the continuity of one
another.109
MiFiD II imposes position limits on the size of a net position
which a person can hold at all times in commodity derivatives traded
on trading venues and economically equivalent OTC contracts. The
limits shall be set on the basis of all positions held by a person and
those held on its behalf at an aggregate group.110 The European
Securities and Market Authority (“ESMA”) will coordinate and
facilitate the implementation of position limits and generally of both
MIFID II and MIFIR111 to harmonize the rules applicable to financial
instruments throughout the Union and to restore the integrity of the
financial market.
The application ratione materiae of MiFiD II is what really brings
novelty to curb excessive speculation. Indeed, the Directive applies
not only to agricultural commodities traded on exchange but also to
economically equivalent derivatives traded over-the-counter or other
valuation of derivatives not traded on exchange is conducted in an independent and
transparent way and reducing the overall volume of derivatives so the volume is
proportionate to the underlying securities).
109. See Directive 2014/65, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 May 2014 on Markets in Financial Instruments and Amending Directive
2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, 2014 O.J. (L 173) pmbl. para. 7
[hereinafter Directive 2014/65] (stating that both legal instruments should form the
legal framework for requirements that are applicable to investment firms, regulated
markets, and data reporting); Regulation 2014/600, of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 15 May 2014 on Markets in Financial Instruments and Amending
Regulation 2012/684, 2014 O.J. (L 173) pmbl. para. 3 [hereinafter Regulation
2014/600].
110. See Directive 2014/65, supra note 109, pmbl. para. 9 (stating that position
limits are created to prevent market abuse and support orderly pricing and
settlement conditions, but will not apply to positions held by or on behalf of a nonfinancial entity and are objectively measurable as reducing risks relating to the
entity’s commercial activity).
111. See Regulation 2014/600, supra note 109, art. 44(1) (explaining that
ESMA will ensure a consistent approach is taken to the powers exercised, the
nature and scope of the imposed measures and the duration of follow-up of
measures while publishing and maintaining a database with summaries of
measures in force).
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trading venues.112 Moreover, the scope of the Directive extends also
to other financial instruments that can give rise to regulatory issues
comparable to traditional financial instruments,113 which is very
likely to be an extension to swaps. The European Parliament insisted
in a proper, although difficult, distinction between speculation and
hedging.114 It noted in its resolution of 2010 that “a distinction must
be made between derivatives used as a risk management tool for
hedging a real underlying risk to which the user is exposed and
derivatives used solely for speculation.”115Additionally, MiFiD II
adds that “position limits shall not apply to positions held by or on
behalf of a non-financial entity and which are objectively measurable
as reducing risks directly relating to the commercial activity of that
non-financial entity.”116 More precisely, according to Commission
Delegated Regulation 149/2013, OTC derivatives contracts such as
agricultural futures derivatives could apply for a hedging exemption,
such as contracts objectively measurable as reducing risks and
directly relating to the commercial activity, if they meet one of the
following three criteria. Criteria A includes covering the risks arising
from the potential change in the value of assets, services, inputs,
products, commodities or liabilities that the non-financial
counterparty or its group owns, produces, manufactures, processes,
provides, purchases, merchandises, leases, sells or incurs or
reasonably anticipates owning, producing, manufacturing,
processing, providing, purchasing, merchandising, leasing, selling or
incurring in the normal course of its business. Criteria B requires
that they cover the risks arising from the potential indirect impact on
112. See Directive 2014/65, art. 57(4), supra note 109 (mandating that a
competent authority will set limits for each contract in commodity derivatives or
their equivalents based on ESMA’s calculation).
113. Id. pmbl. para. 8.
114. See Financial Services Authority & HM Treasury, Reforming OTC
Derivative Markets: A U.K. Perspective, 34, 2009 (UK) (disagreeing with the
approach and does not consider that there should necessarily be a distinction made
between “large speculative” and “large non-speculative” positions for the purposes
of combating manipulation – the focus should be on combating “large positions
that lead to manipulation” irrespective of whether they are held by financial
participants or not. Still, this goes back to the idea of tackling damaging
speculation in the absence of consensus on the causal link between prices hikes
and financial speculation).
115. See Resolution on Derivative Markets: Future policy actions, EUR. PARL.
DOC. P7_TA(2010)0206 para. no. 8 (2010).
116. See Directive 2014/65, supra note 109, art. 57(1)(b).
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the value of assets, services, inputs, products, commodities or
liabilities referred to in criteria a, resulting from fluctuation of
interest rates, inflation rates, foreign exchange rates or credit risk.
Lastly, criteria C requires that they qualify as hedging contracts
pursuant to International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”)
adopted in accordance with article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1606/
2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council.117
ESMA will be in charge of determining the methodology for
calculation of the positions limits for physically settled and cash
settled derivatives at the European level while the national
authorities will have competence to set the actual limits, subject to
possible amendments and confirmation of ESMA.118 In doing so,
ESMA will take into account the following factors: (a) the maturity
of the commodity derivative contracts;(b) the deliverable supply in
the underlying commodity; (c) the overall open interest in that
contract and the overall open interest in other financial instruments
with the same underlying commodity; (d) the volatility of the relevant
markets, including substitute derivatives and the underlying
commodity markets; (e) the number and size of the market
participants; (f) the characteristics of the underlying commodity
market, including patterns of production, consumption and
transportation to market; and(g) the development of new contracts
(emphasis added).119
In its consultation paper of December 2014, ESMA established
that the baseline figure for each commodity derivatives will be 25%
of the deliverable supply that would be available for the spot month
contract. National authorities will have the discretion to set that
117. See Commission Delegated Regulation 2013/149 of 19 December 2012
supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of
the Council with Regard to Regulatory Technical Standards on Indirect Clearing
Arrangements, the Clearing Obligation, the Public Register, Access to a Trading
Venue, Non-Financial Counterparties, and Risk Mitigation Techniques for OTC
Derivatives Contracts Not Cleared by a CCP, 2013 O.J. (L 52) art. 10
(supplementing Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of
the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards on indirect clearing
arrangements, the clearing obligation, the public register, access to a trading venue,
non-financial counterparties, and risk mitigation techniques for OTC derivatives
contracts not cleared by a CCP).
118. See Directive 2014/65, supra note 109, arts. 57(1), 57(3) (explaining this
will be based on the characteristics of the relative derivative).
119. Id.
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figure depending on the evaluation of the 8 factors cited above. In
any case, there cannot be a position limit lower than 10% of
deliverable supply or higher than 40% of deliverable supply.120 The
competent national authorities will also have supervisory power to
control the said positions limits and the power to enforce them
notably via: article 69(o), request any person to take steps to reduce
the size of the position or exposure and article 69(p), limit the ability
of any person from entering into a commodity derivative, including
by introducing limits on the size of a position any person can hold at
all times.121
ESMA will implement these standards in collaboration with the
Member States national authorities, such as the Financial Conduct
Authority for the United Kingdom or the Autorité des marchés
financiers in France, etc., by: (a) request[ing] from any person all
relevant information regarding the size and purpose of a position or
exposure entered into via a derivative; (b) after analyzing the
information obtained in accordance with point (a), require any such
person to reduce the size of or to eliminate the position or exposure;
and (c) as a last resort, limiting the ability of a person from entering
into a commodity derivative.122
The quantitative thresholds set by MiFiD II aim at preventing
market abuse and in particular distorting positions that occur when
there is no convergence between prices of derivatives in the delivery
month and spot prices for the underlying commodity,123 such as
contango and backwardation.
2. Position Limits in the United States of America
In 2010, the U.S. Congress enacted the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which defines itself as “an
120. See European Securities and Markets Authority, Consultation Paper on the
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC, 534 (Dec. 19, 2014)
(defining the deliverable supply as” the commodity that is used either as settlement
for, or as a pricing reference to, that commodity derivative contract).
121. Directive 2014/65, art. 69.2(o)-(p), supra note 86.
122. Regulation 2014/600, art. 45.1, supra note 87.
123. Directive 2014/65, art. 57.1, supra note 86 (explaining further that these
limits do not apply to positions held by or on behalf of a non-financial entity and
are measurable as reducing risks directly relating to the commercial activity of the
entity).
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Act to promote the financial stability of the United States by
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to
end ‘too big to fail,’ to protect the American taxpayer by ending
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services
practices, and for other purposes.”124 Title VII of the Dodd-Franck
Act, also known as the Wall Street Transparency and Accountability
Act of 2010, considerably changed the rules of the game for OTC
derivatives trading.125 In substance, it amended the CEA to tackle
excessive speculation and its undue and unnecessary impacts on the
market and mandated the CFTC to impose position limits including
aggregated position limits.
The purpose of these position limits is clear in the U.S. legislation.
It is meant to diminish, eliminate, or prevent excessive speculation;
deter and prevent market manipulation, squeezes, and corners; ensure
sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers; and ensure that the
price discovery function of the underlying market is not disrupted.126
The application “ratione personae” of position limits is as
follows: the Section 737 a. 2(a) of the Dodd-Franck Act provides:
[W]ith respect to physical commodities other than excluded commodities
as defined by the Commission[the CFTC], the Commission shall by rule,
regulation, or order establish limits on the amount of positions, as
appropriate, other than bona fide hedge positions, that may be held by any
person with respect to contracts of sale for future delivery or with respect
to options on the contracts or commodities traded on or subject to the
rules of a designated contract market (emphasis added).127

Once again, a distinction is made by the legislator according to the
purpose of the speculative activity (offsetting price risks or else). A
bona fide hedger can benefit from a hedging exemption.128
124. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223, pmbl. (2010).
125. See id. tit. VII.
126. See 7 U.S.C. § 6a (2010) (mandating the commission have the power to
shall take actions to the maximum extent possible in its discretion to combat things
like excessive speculation; market manipulation, squeezes, and corners; ensure
market liquidity; and ensure the price discovery function is not disrupted).
127. Id. § 6a(4)(2)(A).
128. See id. § 6a(c)(1) (“No rule, regulation, or order issued under subsection
(a) of this section shall apply to transactions or positions which are shown to be
bona fide hedging transactions or positions, as such terms shall be defined by the
Commission by rule, regulation, or order consistent with the purposes of this
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Application ratione materiae: As stated in section 737 paragraph
5(a) of the Dodd-Franck Act, position limits set by the CFTC apply
to physical commodity futures, physical commodity options, and
economically equivalent swaps.129 Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act
also gives primary jurisdiction to the CFTC to regulate and oversee
swaps while the SEC has competence over security-based swaps.
Finally, the CFTC and the SEC will share the regulatory and
oversight responsibility of mixed swaps.130 Similar to EU regulations,
the CFTC rule 1.3 (z) defines hedging transaction and position as
“transactions or positions normally represent a substitute for
transactions to be made or positions to be taken at a later time in a
physical marketing channel, and where they are economically
appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and management
of a commercial enterprise.”131
As we have seen with the European Union, position limits can be
flexible. For physical delivery contract, the U.S. Code of Federal
Regulations provides that the spot month limit level must be no
greater than necessary “to minimize the potential for manipulation or
distortion of the contract’s or the underlying commodity’s price.”132
For individual non-spot month, the position limit shall not be greater
than 10 percent of the contract’s first 25,000 of open interest and
2.5% thereafter.133

Act.”).
129. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 737 (notwithstanding any other provision of this
section, the Commission shall establish limits on the amount of positions,
including aggregate position limits, as appropriate, other than bona fide hedge
positions, that may be held by any person with respect to swaps that are
economically equivalent to contracts of sale for future delivery or to options on the
contracts or commodities traded on or subject to the rules of a designated contract
market subject to paragraph (2)).
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 8302 (2010) (mandating that the CFTC and SEC consult
and coordinate before commencing rulemaking over swaps, swap dealers, major
swap participants, swap update repositories, derivative clearing organizations in
regards to swaps, people associated with swap dealers or major swap participants,
eligible contract participants, or swap execution facilities).
131. See 17 C.F.R. § 1.3(z) (2014).
132. See 17 C.F.R. § 150.5 (2012).
133. See id. (explaining how a contract market must provide for speculation
limit levels).
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B. IMPLEMENTING A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE
As we have seen above, the CFTC has imposed position limits
before and enforced them on several occasion by fining the dissident
market participants. In essence, the rationale behind the act of the
authority was the simple excess in the number of contract held by
one participants at a certain time to prevent market disruptions. With
the Dodd-Frank amended version of the CEA, the New Regime of
Position Limits is inherently linked with the limitation of speculative
activities within the market. This interpretation of the Act, with
which no necessity finding is required, has therefore attracted the
attention ISDA and SIFMA, two of the biggest trade associations
representing respectively participants in the privately negotiated
derivatives industry and securities firms, banks and asset managers in
the financial industry. In 2011, they brought a claim again the CFTC
claiming the vacatur and remand of the New Position Limits rule
taken pursuant to the mandate granted by the Dodd-Frank amended
version of the CEA; position limits that applied to twenty-eight
agricultural, energy and metals futures contracts and swaps, futures
and options that are economically equivalent to those contracts.
In International Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission,134 before the U.S. District Court of the
District of Columbia on December 2, 2011, the legal issue was the
interpretation of the newly adopted Dodd-Frank Reform that
amended the CEA 1936 and in particular section 4a of the CEA,
which was codified at section 6a of the U.S.C.135 The claimants
contested the CFTC’s authority to impose position limits on
speculative position in the commodities derivatives market without a
positive finding that these position limits are necessary and will be
efficient. 136

134. 887 F.Supp.2d 259 (D.D.C. 2012).
135. See id. at 266 (stating that the case turns on whether the CFTC correctly
interpreted section 61 as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act); see also id. at 273
(declaring that the Plaintiff was correct the plain language of section 6(a)(1) does
not permit the establishment of limits, even if prophylactic or remedial, without
any necessity finding at all).
136. See id. at 264 (stating that Plaintiffs asserted a violation of failure to
determine the rule necessary and appropriate under section 6a and insufficient
evaluation of costs and benefits under section 19).
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The International Swap and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) and
the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(“SIFMA”) contended before the court that the CFTC misinterpreted
the statutory authority mandated by Title VII of Dodd-Frank to
impose the “required” position limits.137 They suggested that the U.S.
Congress authorized the CFTC to establish position limits only if it
finds first that they were “necessary to diminish, eliminate or
prevent . . . an undue and unnecessary burden on interstate commerce
caused by excessive speculation, and are otherwise appropriate as
required in 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(5)(A).”138 Moreover,
they added that in accordance with 7 U.S.C. § 19(a)(3), a satisfying
cost-and-benefits evaluation must be made before the promulgation
of the rule.139
Conversely, the CFTC put forward that the new financial reform
set by the Dodd-Franck Act unambiguously mandates the CFTC to
impose position limits140 and more importantly that it is not
subordinated to an affirmative finding that position limits are
necessary to prevent sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or
unwarranted changes in prices or otherwise necessary for market
protection or required to find that an undue burden on interstate
commerce resulting from excessive speculation exists or is likely to
occur in the future141 to impose position limits.
The decision of the court was based on the interpretation of the
U.S. Congress intent, which in this case was not clear enough to
deduct a clear-cut public policy to see a precautionary application of
position limits. To vacate the CFTC Rule, the judge analyzed
successively the “seriousness of the order’s deficiencies” and “the
disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be
changed.”142 In both cases, it found in disfavor of the CFTC. Judge
137. See id. at 266.
138. See id. at 262 (stating that prior to Dodd-Frank, the Commission had
discretion to set positions limits on futures and options contracts in commodity
derivatives markets).
139. Id. at 265.
140. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 6a (West 2010) (stating the commission should place
limits on the amount of positions, some of which are very specific, and they extend
to economically equivalent contracts).
141. See CFTC, 76 Fed. Reg. 4752 (proposed Jan. 26, 2011) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 1, 150-51).
142. See Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. CFTC, 887 F.Supp.2d 259, 283
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Wilkins recognized the ambiguities in the statute so as to conditions
to impose position limits but was simply not convinced that the
interpretation proposed by the CFTC was the one in line with the
intent of the Dodd-Franck Act.143 As the CFTC rule has not been put
in effect at the time of the decision, the Judge chose to vacate the
rule to avoid disruptive consequences.144
In this case, the fear of red tape won as the absence of a costbenefit analysis of the CFTC rule was highly instrumental in this
decision. It prevailed over an ease of precautionary action, the
imposition of stricter position limits to regulate activities with the
potential to have a terrible impact on the real economy and the
society as a whole versus the risk of non-action analysis.
Nevertheless, applying a precautionary principle to the financial
industry is not a far-fetched idea when taking into consideration what
is at stakes globally and the exponential use of high risk, opaque, and
extremely complex financial products. Precaution is not a zero-risk
policy; in EU law, it is subordinated to the identification of
potentially adverse effects, the evaluation of the scientific data
available, and the extent of scientific uncertainty.145
On the contrary, the U.S. traditionally prefers a cost-benefit
approach over a precautionary approach. The threshold in the U.S. is
higher with a required cost-benefit analysis and a finding of
significant risk before triggering regulation in case uncertainty
posing a threat to the public. To say the least, as the landmark
Benzene case 1980 put it, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant
(a health and safety administrative agency) contended that in order to
overturn a standard the onus to prove the absence of risk should lay
on the industry,146 the Supreme Court found that there must be
(D.D.C. 2012) (writing that the result of both tests favored vacating the rule on
remand).
143. See id. at 280 (holding that the court cannot uphold the CFTC’s
interpretation of the amendments under Chevron Step One).
144. See id. at 283-84 (analyzing that the Court considers two factors when
deciding to vacate: seriousness of the order’s deficiencies and disruptive
consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed).
145. European Commission, Communication from the Commission on the
Precautionary Principle 5.1 (2000) (triggering factors leading to recourse to the
precautionary principle).
146. See Antonin Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, AMERICAN ENTER.
INSTIT. J.L. ON GOV’T & SOC’Y 25 (1980) (explaining the issue to be whether
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significant risk147 to trigger regulation. These were the exact same
contentions of ISDA and SIFMA in the case before Judge Wilkins.
ISDA and SIFMA stated that the CFTC can impose position limits if
“it makes an informed determination that there is a reasonable
likelihood that excessive speculation will pose a problem in a
particular market, and that position limits are likely to curtail it
without imposing undue costs.”148 Their claims as to the existence of
a burden of proof are very dangerous and it is regrettable that Judge
Wilkins did not answer the question whether or not the CFTC must
make an affirmative finding of excessive speculation causing high
commodities prices and volatility before triggering actions.149
The affirmative would presume that position limits are a “cure” to
excessive speculation and not a measure of precaution. At worst, it
could be that legislators have to bend before the uncertainties of the
financial market. If that happens, we must wonder who serves whom
in the state-market relationship.
Excessive speculation poses a threat to the right to food of
millions. It is a threat that cannot go unnoticed especially since the
food price crisis of 2008. Undoubtedly, and as the study above of
causality have demonstrated, the financial industry evolves in an
esoteric and endogenous environment, which deprives the state of
any predictability power in some instances. Still, society should not
have to wait for ––a global financial crisis or hunger revolts to tackle
rampant issues in the financial industry.
A strong case of excessive speculation distorting the commodities
derivatives market is dependent upon correct data and a correct
interpretation of these data. However, since finance cannot be an
exact science, financial studies are rarely epistemological, in the
French philosophical sense, and rarely reach true objectivity.
Consequently, in the case of excessive speculation and commodities
before OSHA issues a toxic standard it must establish that the condition the
standard addresses is probable and presents a material health risk).
147. Id. at 27 (writing that the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation has
become more popular, including in Supreme Court opinions to give a statute
narrow construction).
148. See Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. CFTC, 887 F.Supp.2d 259, 273
(stating that the plaintiffs do not contest that the CFTC may impose position limits
“prophylactically”).
149. See id. at 280.
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prices, the question should pertain to what level of risk uncertainty is
high enough to trigger regulation? If the actions of financial
speculators might or might not have been the cause of denial of a
right to food in 2008, the level of risk of crystallization of public
harm should be enough to trigger political and legislative action.
Regulating excessive speculation in the commodities derivatives
markets is no easy task, but it has been done before. Unambiguously,
Title VII of Dodd-Frank and MifiD II fight damaging speculative
activities. The position limits instituted both in the European Union
and the United States are variables put to the discretion of regulatory
authorities. Only time will tell whether these position limits as well
as transparency requirements and reporting obligations will pass the
test of efficiency and extend to global standards.
In the midst of all these uncertainty, one thing is for certain: that
test of efficiency does not depend on data or the occurrence of
another financial crisis, it depends on public policy. A policy of
precaution when navigating in rough water: imposing transparency,
reporting, disclosure of swaps data, increasing predictability power
of the state, etc. As such, this case of excessive speculation and
agricultural prices might just be the epitome of the actual ramble in
the financial market-state relationship.

